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LOSS OF USE AS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES
RICHARD D. HALL
of the Denver Bar

Last year 54,157 vehicles in Colorado were involved in auto
accidents according to the records of the Colorado Department of
Revenue. The use of almost all of these cars was lost for some
period of time while they were being repaired, and undoubtedly
the owners of about one-half of these cars made some claim for
damages. In view of this large number of liability claims which
include, or could include, a demand for loss of use as well as other
elements of special damage, one would reasonably expect there
would be an extensive body of law on the subject. The very reverse, however, is true in Colorado, and as a result attorneys
making loss of use claims usually find themselves uncertain as to
the law in this state.
Regarding the pleading of this loss of use element of damages, it is well settled in Colorado that such loss of use is an item
of special damages and must be specially pleaded.' Similarly, it
is clear that in proving his claim for loss of use of a vehicle, a
plaintiff must prove that the vehicle was necessarily unavailable
for use during the period of time reasonably necessary for the
repair of the vehicle with ordinary diligence.2 Such period of
time does not, however, include the time during which the vehicle
was unnecessarily unavailable because the owner failed to reach
a decision promptly as to whether or not to have the vehicle repaired, or as to where the repair work was to be done.'
Assuming the plaintiff has properly pleaded his claim and
has proven the period for which the loss of use is claimed, there
is presented the difficult problem of proving with a reasonable
degree of certainty the amount of such loss of use damages. In
Hunter v. Quaintance,4 the plaintiff's Oakland automobile was
badly damaged in an accident, and as part of his proof of damages the plaintiff offered evidence at the trial as to the value of
its use for the two months during which it was being repaired.
The trial court instructed the jury that:
The correct measure of damage in this case is the
reasonable cost of repairing said Quaintance's automobile in order to put it in as good condition as it was in
before the injury complained of . . . plus any direct loss
the said Quaintance may have sustained by reason of
the loss of the use of said automobile during a reasonable
length of time for its repair . . .
'Rule 9(g), Rules of Civil Procedure; Hunter v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 168 P.
918 (1917).
2 Allen v. Brown, 159 Minn. 61, 198 N.W. 137 (1924) ; Kohl v. Arp, 236 Iowa 31,
17 N.W. 2d 824 (1945) ; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Harrell, 66 F. Supp. 559 (D. Okla.
1946) ; Adams v. Burnett, 150 So. 403 (La. App. 1932).
3 See cases in n. 2, supra.
469 Colo. 28, 168 P. 918 (1917).
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After a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed
to the Colorado Supreme Court which, in considering the submission to the jury of the plaintiff's loss of use claim, stated:
It is urged that, the evidence showing that the car
was used only for purposes of pleasure, there is no basis
for estimating the damage from the loss of such use.
Cases are cited which hold that the damage from such a
source is too speculative to be considered. We are. inclined to agree with that opinion.
The court then proceeded to point out that the alleged loss of use
damage had not been pleaded and that the issue of negligence submitted to the jury had not been confined to acts of negligence
alleged in the complaint and then reversed the judgment "for the
reasons above given."
Although the supreme court certainly could have been more
positive in its statement, this case in the writer's opinion does
establish for Colorado the doctrine that a party who loses the use
of a vehicle used by him solely for pleasure and general family
purposes and who sustains no specific out-of-pocket expense as
a direct result of such loss of use, cannot recover compensation for
such loss of use. In the writer's opinion this doctrine still applies
in Colorado although the plaintiff can prove a definite rental value
for vehicles of the type damaged in the accident, and although the
majority rule in other jurisdictions would seem to be to the contrary.5
Since a car owned for pleasure and family purposes may sit
in the garage all day or be used for only a few minutes in a day,
it would seem improper to apply a full day's rental value as a
measure of damages resulting from loss of use in such a case.
Also, the rental value of such a car is not a measure of the inconvenience caused by the loss of use of a car used for such purposes,
and such evidence in such a case would still leave a judgment for'
a sum of money up to speculation and conjecture. This rule has
been objected to as placing at a disadvantage a plaintiff who lacks
the credit or available cash to rent a replacement vehicle,6 though
finds minority support in other jurisdictions besides Colorado. 7
DAMAGE

CANNOT BE SPECULATIVE

This case of Hunter v. Quaintance does not in the writer's
opinion establish as a rule that the loss of use of any vehicle used
"only for purposes of pleasure" is not recoverable under any and
all circumstances. Since the reason given for the disallowance of
5Atlanta
Furniture Co. v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781, 181 S.E. 498 (1935) ; Parilli
v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 260 N.Y.S 60 (1932) ; Longworth v. McGrath, 108 Conn. 738,
143 A. 845 (1928).
6 Naughton Mulgrew Mtr. Car Co. v. Westchester Fish Co., 173 N.Y.S. 437 (1918)
Pittari v. Madison Ave. Coach Co., 68 N.Y.S. 2d 741 (1947).
,Goode v. Hantz, 209 La. 821, 25 So. 2d 604 (1946) ; Adams v. Burnett, 150 So.
403 (La. App. 1933); Kane v. Carpet-Dover Merc. Co:, 206 Ark. 674, 177 S.W. 2d
41 (1944).
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such item in this case was the highly speculative nature of the
damages in the case, the court could very logically hold that a
plaintiff who, for example, is a tourist using his car solely for
purposes of pleasure and who rents a substitute car during the
time the use of his own is necessarily lost can recover the amount
of the car rental bill actually incurred by him. Similarly, where
the plaintiff has used the car solely to go to and from work and
for general pleasure purposes and has rented a substitute car or
incurred bus fares while his own car was laid up for repairs, he
should be able to recover the amounts actually so expended by him.
This latter set of facts is found in the case of Longo v. Monast 8
in which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island did allow such a
loss of use claim.
In the writer's opinion, Hunter v. Quaintance does not hold
by implication that the loss of use of a vehicle used solely for
commercial or .business purposes is always recoverable. In Interurban Transp. Co. v. F. Strauss & Sons,9 the plaintiff's bus was
damaged in an accident, and the bus company lost the use of it
while necessary repairs were being made. However, in view of
the fact that the plaintiff owned an extra bus which it kept for
such emergencies and used in this case, the court held that the
alleged damages for loss of use of the larger and more comfortable
damaged bus were too speculative under the evidence to support
a recovery. From these examples it can be seen that the real issue
in these cases is not whether a so-called "pleasure" use or "commercial or business" use is involved, but whether the evidence as
to the damages arising from the loss of use is sufficiently definite
and certain to warrant a recovery.
Where the plaintiff can prove actual disbursements for rental
of cars or trucks, taxicab fares, bus fares, or train or airplane
fares as a direct result of the loss of use of a vehicle, such disbursements are by the vast weight of authority recoverable by the
plaintiff. l0 Many difficult questions arise, however, when the alleged direct financial loss is claimed to be a loss of personal earnings or profits because of the loss of use of the vehicle or other
property. In Parks v. Sullivan," the surveying instruments belonging to the plaintiff were damaged beyond repair by the defendant's
wagon, and it allegedly took the plaintiff 20 days to procure a new
set. The judgment of the trial court allowing plaintiff damages
in the sum of $5.00 per day for 20 days to cover his loss of earnings allegedly resulting from the loss of use of such instruments
was reversed on appeal by the Colorado Supreme Court which
noted that the testimony failed to show that plaintiff was unable
to perform any other work than surveying during the 20 day
870

R I. 460, 40 A. 2d 433 (1944).
0196 So. 467 (La. App., 1940).

10see cases collected in 169 A.L.R. 1087, 1117; 5 Am. Jur. (Automobiles)
25 C.J.S. (Damages) § 41.
146 Colo. 340, 104 P. 1035

(1909).

§ 750,
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period, and further noted that the accident did not necessarily
prevent his employment in work other than that requiring the
use of the surveying instruments. However, if the plaintiff had
clearly proven that he attempted to find other employment but
was unsuccessful, that other surveying instruments could not be
obtained on a rental basis, and that he procured a new set of instruments as soon as possible, the judgment in favor of plaintiff
presumably would have been upheld.
Wherever recovery is sought for diminished earnings or
profits because of the loss of use of a vehicle, it would seem that
the plaintiff would be required to establish as part of his proof2
the unavailability of a temporary replacement on a rental basis.'
This would follow from the duty of the plaintiff to mitigate damages. Also the plaintiff would be required to prove an established
business under the law setting forth this limitation on any
recov13
ery for loss of profits or earnings based on commissions.
The case of Parks v. Sullivan, supra, is important too in that
the Colorado Supreme Court in that case by implication accepted
the view that damages for loss of use are allowable not only for
the period during which an article is being repaired, but also for
the period necessarily spent by the plaintiff in replacing a nonrepairable article with a new one. This is probably the minority
rule, 14 but in the writer's opinion it is much more reasonable and
logical than the majority rule.
Where the plaintiff is seeking recovery for the loss of use of
a vehicle during the period it was necessarily being repaired, the
majority of courts have limited the total recovery for repairs and
loss of use to the difference between the value of the vehicle before and after the accident. ' , However, other courts limit the
total recovery only to the value of the vehicle before the accident,
without deduction for the value of the vehicle in its damaged condition after the accident.' 6 The first rule appears more desirable
to this writer, for the plaintiff in making his decision as to whether
to repair or to sell the car in its damaged condition for salvage
should be required to take into consideration the amount of his
prospective loss of use claim plus repair bill as opposed to the
difference in the value of the vehicle before and after the accident,
and should be required to follow the course which keeps his total
damages, including all elements, to the minimum possible.
-Hanson
v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381, 279 N.W. 227 (1938); Jellum v. Grays Harbor
Fuel Co., 160 Wash. 585, 295 P. 939 (1931) ; Francischini v. McMullen, 6 N. J. Misc.
736, 142 A. 651 (1928).
" Diamond Rubber Co. v. Harryman, 41 Colo. 415, 92 P. 922 (1907); Milheim v.
Baxter, 46 Colo. 155, 103 P. 376 (1909) ; 15 Am. Jur. p. 819.
"4Glass v. Miller, 51 N.E. 2d 299 (Ohio App. 1940) ; Colonial Mtr. Coach Corp. v.
New York C. R. Co., 228 N.Y.S. 508 (1928) ; Contra: Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727,
238 N.W. 364 (1931) ; German v. Centaur Line Co., 295 S.W. 475 (Mo. App. 1927)
Kohl v. Arp, 236 Iowa 31, 17 N.W. 2d 824 (1945).
'5 Missouri P. R. Co. v. Qualls, 120 Okla. 49, 250 P. 774 (1926); Cunningham v.
Crane Co., 255 I1. App. 373 (1930).
18Lamb v. Landers, 67 Ga. App. 588, 21 S.E. 2d 321 (1942) ; Atlanta Furniture Co.
v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781, 181 S.E. 498 (1935).
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LOSS OF PROFITS AS AN ELEMENT
OF DAMAGES
ROBERT S. APEL*

As a general principle, one of the most important elements
of damage in an action for personal injuries is the loss of time
incurred by the injured party.' Such loss is most easily shown in
the case of a person who works on a salary basis by showing loss
of earnings arising from his enforced absence from work. However, in the case of a man who owns his own business, pays himself no salary, and does not evaluate his services, but who simply
takes the net profits as his income, proof of loss of time is a more
difficult problem.
In a case such as this, can the profits of the business in preceding years be shown to provide a basis on which to measure the
value of his loss of time?
This is the problem with which we are concerned here. We
do not attempt to deal with the question of damages which arise
from loss of profits caused by the breach of a contract, nor are we
concerned with such damages as arise out of a tort which has
caused the injured party the loss of a specific opportunity to make
profits. It is important to distinguish the problem at hand from
these situations, especially the latter. The principles and reasoning behind the recovery for each differ entirely. The courts in many
and find themselves lost in a
cases fail to make the distinction
2
morass of reasoning and rules.
There is general agreement with regard to the general rule
which is easy to state, more difficult to apply. The courts say that
if profits are to be used as a measure of past earnings, the element
of personal service must predominate in the business, and the
business cannot involve the investment of more than an insignificant amount of capital. 3 The reasoning behind this rule is quite
clear. If the business were based on any economic factor other
than personal service of the injured party, any loss in its profits
might be due to any one of several factors above and beyond the
injury to the plaintiff. On the other hand, where the business is
purely personal, it would seem that past profits are the most
realistic measure of past earnings that are available.4 Some courts
even go so far as to say that when the business is a purely personal one, then profits may be called earnings and the two terms
are synonymous. 5 The better reasoning recognizes that the two
Student, University of Denver College of Law.
ON DAMAGES 309 (1935).
2Herr v. Warren Scharf Paving Co., 118 Wisc. 57, 94 N. W. 789
'Kronold v. City of New York, 186 N. Y. 40, 78 N. E. 572 (1906)
Bros.4 Yellow Cab, 145 So. 60 (La. App. 1933) ; 25 C.J.S. 618.
MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES 311 (1935).
5 Roy v. United Electric Ry. Co., 52 R.I. 173, 159 A. 637 (1932).
*

'MCCORMICK

(1903).
; Crozat v. Toye
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terms are not synonymous and that the profits are simply evidence
of the earnings.6
In cases where the capital invested is not insignificant in
amount and the relative proportion of personal services rendered
by the injured person is small, the profits in other years are inadmissible as evidence of past earnings.7 In such a case, however,
it is always permissible to show the character, nature, and extent
of the business and the value of the services rendered by the injured person in determining the value of the loss of his time."
The Colorado cases which have dealt with this problem are
in conformity with the general rule. In at least two decided cases,
evidence as to the amount of past profits was allowed to be shownY
It is plain that Colorado uses the past profits only as evidence of
the loss of time and does not consider that profits are identical
with earnings. 10 In an early Colorado decision, the court held that
evidence of past profits was not admissible since the profits in
question were not the result of the labor of the plaintiff alone, but
were, at least in part, derived from other elements; and because
of the uncertainties and fluctuating nature of such business, they
could not be the basis for the estimation of damages.'
In the
same case, the court ruled that such profits, if this had been the
type of situation where they were recoverable, would have had to
have been specially pleaded. Most courts impose no such require12
ment.
This statement of the general rule and its applicability should
give us little pause. The application of the rule to concrete facts,
however, is more difficult, for only then does the concept of the
rule take form and begin to embody meaning.
One of the easiest fact situations with which to begin is that
of the professional man-the dentist, physician, or attorney. It
is at once obvious that his business depends entirely on his skill
and proficiency, that the capital invested is only in books or tools
of the trade, and that these would be useless were it not for his
professional skill. The courts agree that in the case of injury to
a doctor, lawyer, or other professional man, the personal and intellectual ability of the individual is the predominating feature
and is so great as compared to the insignificant amount of capital
invested that past profits may be shown as evidence of past earnings. 13 Some courts are even prone to consider the professional
6Apfelbaum v. Markley, 134 Pa. 392, 3 A. 2d 975 (1939) ; Dempsey v. Scranton,
264 Pa. S. 495, 107 A. 877 (1919).
7Note 5, supra.
IUnion Depot & Ry. Co. v. Londoner, 50 Colo. 22, 114 P. 316 (1911) ; Rio Grande
Western Ry. Co. v. Rubenstein, 15 Colo. App. 121, 38 P. 76 (1894) ; 25 C.J.S. 619.
9 Trujillo v. Wilson, 117 Colo. 430, 189 P. 2d 147 (1948); Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. v. Sanger, 87 Colo. 369, 287 P. 866 (1930).
"oNote 9, supra.
"City of Pueblo v. Griffin, 10 Colo. 366, 15 P. 616 (1887).
"MCCORmICK ON DAMAGES 314 (1.935).
" Crozat v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab, 145 S. 60
(La. App. 1933) (dentist) ; Marshall
v. Wabash R. Co., 171 Mich. 180, 137 N.W. 89 (1912)
(physician); Nye v. Adamson,
130 Neb. 887, 266 N.W. 767 (1936)
(attorney); New Jersey Exp. Co. v. Nichols, 33
N.J.L. 434 (1867)
(architect).
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man in a category by himself and are apt to state the general rule
in only a more limited form as to professional men. 14 Most courts
will allow a showing of such profits even if the injured person was
a partner with another who continued the business while the injured was absent. 15
Logically, it would seem that an actor can be placed in the
same category as a professional man. Here again, the element of
personal skill far outweighs any insignificant amount of capital
which may be invested. There can be little doubt of the application of the general rule to this situation, and it gives the courts
no trouble.' 6
On the other hand, there are those occupations in which the
element of personal supervision and control required in the business is relatively slight in proportion to the amount of capital or
labor of others invested. Such a case would be that of a contractor who works merely in a supervisory capacity over his
employees. This case would logically be the opposite extreme from
the professional man, and any profits made by him might be the
result of any one of a number of factors in his business above and
beyond his personal supervision. Pursuing this line of reasoning,
the courts generally hold that such profits are not admissible as
evidence of past earnings. 7
Within the broad extremes shown by these various occupations others exist. Certain types of occupations seem to fall consistently within the rule, and evidence of past profits is admissible.
In the usual case of dressmakers, 8 boarding-house keepers, 19 small
farmers, 20 and teachers, 21 the nature of the work is such that
personal skill and ability are major elements and the amount of
capital is always negligible. Thus, in the case of a boarding-house
keeper, it has been said that the ability to acquire profits requires
certain special qualities such as having a gift of management,
being -a good buyer, knowing how to provide liberally but not
lavishly, possessing tact, prudence and discretion. 22 In the case
of a person running a small restaurant, the Colorado court did
not consider these qualities as predominate as the capital invested
in the business and did not allow evidence of loss of profits.23
4

1 Nash v. Sharpe, 19 Hun. (N. Y.) 365 (1879)
(dentist).
' Walker v. Erie R. Co., 63 Barb. (N. Y.)
260 (1872)
(attorney,) ; accord, Chicago
R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Scheimkoenig, 62 Kan. 57, 11 P. 414 (1900)
(cattle dealer, partner
with another allowed to show profits) ; Welch v. W",are, 32 Mlich. 77 (1875)
(actor who
performed with his wife, but neither acted while P. was sick, allowed to recover as to
his share of the past profits).
16'Welch v. Ware, supra note 15.
,, Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hale, 186 F. 626 (8th Cir. 1911) (contractor employed to deliver gravel, used teams, tools, labor to do work) ; Gombert v. New York
Central & H. R. R. Co., 195 N.Y. 273, 88 N.E. 382 (1909)
(building carpenter who
seldom did work himself, but supervised and furnished materials) ; Pryor v. Metropolitan Street R. Co., 85 Mo. App. 367 (1900) (contractor on public improvements).
"s City of Kankakee v. Steinbach, 89 111. App. 513 (1900).
"'Rogers v. Youngs, 252 Mich. 420, 233 N. W. 365 (1930).
-Note
9 supra; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Scheimkoenig, 62 Kan. 57, 11 P. 414

(1900).

n Simonin v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 36 Hun. (N. Y.) 214 (1885).
Comstock v. Conn. Ry. & Lighting Co., 77 Conn. 65, 58 A. 465 (1904).
23 City of Pueblo v. Griffin, supra note 11.
22
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On the other hand, some cases exist in which evidence of past
profits quite generally is inadmissible. Any large business falls
2 5
in this category as in the case of a merchant 24 or manufacturer.
In certain other occupations, the admissibility of evidence of
profits is dependent upon the particular facts surrounding the case.
A variance of facts may lead to opposite results within the same
occupation. A distinction has been made in the case of a mover
who perhaps owns a small truck and does his own work and a
large concern of movers employing a fleet of trucks.2 In the case
of a jeweler whose main business was to repair watches, the court
allowed a showing of profits.2 7 If the jeweler had been engaged in
a more extensive business such as that of selling jewelry, had
maintained a large inventory, and engaged employees to aid him,
the result might well have been different.
In the same vein, it would seem that the profits of a druggist,
as the term is commonly employed, might well be based on so
many factors other than personal service that evidence of past
profits would be inadmissible. On its particular facts, however,
28
one case has held that evidence of such profits was admissible.
The corner filling station operator was allowed to show his profits,
but in that case the owner personally operated his station with
only one hired employee.2 9 The modern super-service chain operator who does not own a pair of overalls might well be in30 a different3
situation as to the showing of his profits. A fisherman, a florist, '
and an iceman 32 who worked for themselves with no hired help
in
or had at the most one hired employee were involved -in cases
33
which the decisions varied with the particular facts at hand.
In the last analysis then, it seems that when the personal skill
of the plaintiff is the major factor, the predominating factor, in
the success or failure of the business the value of his time may
well be said to be measured by the profits of such a business. On
the other hand, when -the business becomes dependent upon the
labor of others or upon capital investments, the profits and any
decrease thereof; do not necessarily result from the owner's time
spent in the business, and the value of his time cannot be said to
be measured by the profits of the business. Profits in the latter
case may be the result of these other factors rather than any personal efforts of the plaintiff.
- Dempsey v. City of Scranton, supra note 6 (P. sold tea and coffee in his business
employing three clerks, and he drove a wagon from which selling was done. Business
had been built up by P. personally).
Blerbach v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 54 Wisc. 208, 11 N.W. 514 (1882).
226
T Spreen v. Erie R. Co., 219 N.Y. 533, 114 N.E. 1049 (1916).
Helken v. United Rys. Co., 227 S.W. 654 (Mo. 1921).
28
Dallas R. & Terminal Co. v. Darden, 38 S.W. 2d 777 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931)
(P. ran a drugstore with no capital and only one helper).
mBissonette v. National Biscuit Co.. 100 F. 2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1939).
30Lund v. Tyler, 115 Iowa 236, 88 N.W. 333 (1901).
31 Gilmore v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 253 Pa. 543, 98 A. 698 (1916).
32DiBernardo v. Conn. Co., 100 Conn. 612, 124 A. 231 (1924) ; Fishang v. Eyermann Contracting Co., 333 Mo.. 874, 63 S.W. 2d 30 (1933).
33 See 9 A.L.R. 511, 27 A.L.R. 432, 63 A.L.R. 146, 122 A.L.R. 297 for a classification by occupation of many cases dealing with this problem.
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INTEREST AS DAMAGES IN COLORADO
NICHOLAS H. MAGILL*
of the Denver Bar

The purpose of this study is to inquire into the law of Colorado with respect to the rights of a party litigant to recover interest on, or as, damages for the injury to, or the detention, loss or
destruction of, property, where the interest claimed is for a period
of time prior to judgment. Discussion of interest on damages for
personal injuries occasioned by the tort of another is eliminated,
except to note, in passing, that such interest is recoverable from
the time suit is filed by virtue of chapter 50, section 5, of the 1935
Colorado Statutes Annotated.
It is convenient, and perhaps necessary to an orderly approach
to the question of interest, to consider, first, chapter 88, section 2,
of the 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated, which, while enumerating
the circumstances under which interest will be allowed, in effect
provides that interest, where there is no conflicting agreement,
shall be allowed on all claims for money due where the amount
of the claim is liquidated. In substance, this statute provides that
creditors shall be allowed to receive interest, when there is no
agreement as to rate, at the rate of six per cent. per annum for
all moneys after they become due on:
(1) any bill, bond, promissory note, or other instrument in
writing from the time the same becomes due;
(2) any judgment from the date of the entry of the judgment;
(3) money due on mutual settlement of accounts from the date
of such settlement;
(4) money due on account from the date the same became due;
(5) money received to the use of another and retained without
the owner's consent, from the time of the receipt thereof;
and
(6) on money taken or retained and fraudulently converted
to the taker's use, from the time of the taking.
This statute, as now embodied in our statutes, although since
its origin has been subjected to minor amendments, is substantially
the same as the statutes which were in effect at the time the cases
hereinafter cited were decided.
Perhaps the import of the above statute, with respect to interest on claims for unliquidated damages, can in no way be better
manifested than in quoting from the opinion in Denver, South
Park & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Conway,' a leading case on this question. This was an action to recover damages for injury to property
as a result of a fire caused by the defendant's negligence. A claim
for interest on the damages was disallowed, the court holding
that: "Interest in this state is a creature of statute and regulated
thereby. It is only recoverable, in absence of contract, in the
Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
18 Colo. 1, 5 P. 142 (1884).
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cases enumerated in the statute, and damages to property arising
from the wrong or negligence of a defendant is not one of the
enumerated cases." 2
WHERE DAMAGES ARE UNLIQUIDATED

There are several cases in Colorado which have seemingly
allowed interest on a claim for unliquidated damages, and which
do not come under any of the circumstances enumerated in the
interest statute. At first blush, these cases appear to conflict with
the rule set forth in Railroad v. Conway, supra; but, upon examination, it will be found that in all these cases there was a wrongful
detention of property. While an equivalent of interest on the value
of the property detained was recovered, it was not recovered as
interest, as such, but as damages for the detention of the property,
the legal rate of interest being used merely as a convenient measure of the plaintiff's loss occasioned by the detention of his property by the defendant. The distinction is emphasized in the following cases.
Machette v. Wanless 3 was an action of replevin for grain in
which the plaintiff was permitted to recover, as damages for the
detention of the grain, an amount equal to legal interest on the
value of the property for the period of the detention. The court
used the interest rate as a convenient measure of the damages for
the detention, and not to allow recovery of interest as such. This
is brought out in the following quotation.
Where the property is domestic animals, valuable for service
only, the value of the use of the animals is, of course, the measure
of compensation; but where, as in this case, the article is intended
for consumption, interest upon the value of it would seem to be the
true compensation. If the owner of grain should wish to obtain the
like quantity, he must purchase in the market, at current prices, and
he would be deprived of the use of the money thus invested. The
best estimate of his loss is interest upon the amount of money which
he would, for that purpose, be compelled to pay out.'

Omaha & Grant Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tabor 5 was an action
to recover damages for the conversion of ore, in which the plaintiff
was denied, by the trial court, interest as damages for the detention. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in reversing for this error,
said:
It is true, as stated by the learned Judge, "that interest in this
state is a creature of statute and regulated thereby; that it is only
recoverable, in the absence of contract, in cases enumerated in the
statute; and that damages to property arising from a wrong or
negligence of defendant is not one of the enumerated cases." This
[case] could not come under the last clause of the instruction. It
is not for damages to property. It is for the wrongful detention of
money [since to detain the ore or the money into which it was converted was indirectly to detain the money] belonging to plaintiff.
2

8 Colo. at p. 16, 5 P.

at p.

(1884).

'2 Colo. 169 (1873).

2 Colo. at p. 180.
513 Colo. 41, 21 P.
4

925 (1889).

151, Accord: Railroad v. Moynahan,

8 Colo. 56,

5 P.
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It is clearly distinguishable from 1;'ailroadv. Conway, 8 Colo. 1....
In
our state damages for detention of the money equal to the legal interest upon the value of the chattels converted from the time of the
conversion has been allowed, not as interest, but as damages.6

Greeley, Salt Lake & Pac. R. Co. v. Yount 7 was an action to
recover damages for the unauthorized appropriation of land, in
which it was held, on the authority of Railroad v. Conway, supra,
that interest was not recoverable. The court, confronted with the
decisions in Machette v. Wanless, supra, and Refining Co. v. Tabor,
supra, distinguished these cases on the basis that interest was
there allowed, not as interest, but as damages for the detention
of personal property. Said the court: "These decisions were not
based on the statute, and the statute did not figure in them, except
in so far as the rate of interest which it allowed on money was
used as a criterion by which the damages might be estimated." 8
The foregoing cases would seem to sufficiently emphasize the
distinction between those cases which have allowed interest as
damages and those which have disallowed interest on damages on
an unliquidated claim. In all of the cases in which interest has
apparently been recovered on an unliquidated claim it will be
found that there was a wrongful detention of the plaintiff's property by the defendant, and the interest was allowed, not as interest, as such, but as damages for the detention.
WHERE FRAUD IS INVOLVED

There is another line of cases in Colorado-those dealing with
fraud in the sale of property-in which the courts have again
seemingly permitted a recovery of interest in conflict with the
rule that interest, as such, can only be recovered under the circumstances enumerated in the statute. But, again, a study of
these cases will reveal that the interest was not recovered on damages, but rather as damages. Although in these cases there has
not been a detention of property in the technical sense, still, the
conduct of the defendant, in a practical sense, is tantamount to
a withholding of the plaintiff's property, and the interest has been
allowed, as in the conversion cases, as damages for the wrongful
withholding of property from the plaintiff. Let us consider some
of these cases.
Mayo v. Wallgreen 9 was an action for deceit in the purchase
of land. The defendant, having an option to buy land at $100 per
acre, falsely represented to the plaintiff that he was to pay $150
per acre, and induced the plaintiff to join with him in the purchase of the land at the higher figure. The plaintiff, upon learning
that the defendant had purchased the land at the lesser figure,
while plaintiff's contribution to the defendant had been at the
higher figure, sought damages for the deceit. The court held that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover the difference between the
613 Colo. at p. 57, 21 P. at 931.
7 Colo. App. 189, 42 P. 1023 (1895).
8 7 Colo. App. at p. 193, 42 P. at p. 1025.
'9 Colo. App. 506, 50 P. 40 (1897).
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the two prices with interest from the time plaintiff gave defendant the money until the date of recovery. Said the court:
In this state, in the absence of some statutory provision permitting interest to be recovered, it may not generally enter into or
form a part of the damages which a party may receive if he gets
judgment. The general rule is subject to some exceptions, and we are
of the opinion that this case is brought within the exception sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Omaha & Grant Smelting and Ref. Co.
v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41."1 [sapra].

The opinion is devoid of any discussion, other than the language above quoted, of the exception to the general interest rule
under which this case was held to come. It is clear, however, that
the Court of Appeals was referring to the rule of the conversion
and detention cases as the exception to the general interest rule.
This is manifest in the court's citation of Refining Co. v. Tabor,
discussed supra, as authority for its holding.
Three later cases apparently contra 2 to the Mayo case are
13
Clark v. Giacomini11 Keeney v. Angell,1 and Otis v. Grimes.
These were actions to recover damages for false representations
inducing an exchange of property, indistinguishable in fact, to
this writer's mind, from the Mayo case. Apparently ignoring the
Mayo case, or else tacitly declining to follow it, our Supreme Court
held that interest was not recoverable, making no distinction between interest on and interest as damages.
But a still later case dealing with fraud in the exchange of
property, in which the distinction between interest on and interest
as damages has again been observed, is Bankers Trust Co. v. International Trust Co.14 This was an action against a trust company
to recover money paid for mortgage notes, the purchase of which
was allegedly induced by the misrepresentation of the value of
the mortgage security. The plaintiff waived the action in tort for
deceit and, instead, rescinded the contract for fraud, and sued in
quasi-contract to recover the money paid for the notes. The court
held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover interest from the
time of the transaction until restitution was made.
The court, although citing the Clark, Keeney and Otis cases,
supra, for the proposition that interest could not be recovered in
actions for damages for deceit, neither expressly overruled these
cases, nor did it distinguish them. Nor was the case brought within
the purview of the interest statute. But, rather, the interest was
allowed under the authority of the conversion and detention cases,
discussed supra, which permit the recovery of interest as damages
for the detention of property. This is clear from the following
language in the opinion:
Notwithstanding that in this jurisdiction the decisions are
uniform in holding that interest is a creature of statute, and, in
10 9 Colo. App. at p. 518, 50 P. at p. 45.
1185 Colo. 530, 277 P. 306 (1929).
1292 Colo. 213, 19 P. 2d 215 (1933).
" 97 Colo. 219, 48 P. 2d 788 (1935).
."108Colo. 15, 113 P. 2d 656 (1941).
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absence of contract, is recoverable as such only in such cases as
are enumerated in the state, [citations omitted] . . . the courts of
this state, even when interest is not recoverable under the statute,
by distinguishing between interest as such, and interest as damages,
many times have allowed the equivalent of interest in the way of
damages, for the tortious taking and detention of money or property.5

To bring the case within the rule of the conversion and detention cases, the court reasoned that where, as here, the defrauded
party rescinds the contract, the recission relates back to the time
of the fraudulent transaction; that there is a duty upon the defendant to make restitution, and a concurrent breach of that duty,
as of the time of the fraudulent transaction; and that (although
this is not expressly stated by the court, it seems a necessary and
proper inference from that which was expressly stated) the breach
of the duty to make restitution was tantamount to a detention of
the plaintiff's money.
Now, let us consider the distinction, if any, between this case
and the Clark, Keeney, and Otis cases, supra. The fact that the
Bankers Trust Co. case was an action ex contractu, following a
recission for fraud, while the latter cases were actions ex delicto
for deceit, glaringly presents itself to be seized as the point of
distinction. It is easy-too easy-to accept this as the basis of distinction and conclude that there is a real difference in fact, when
difference there is none. The distinction is in form only. It is
illusory, and vanishes as we look to the substance of the respective
actions, the substance being the tortious conduct of the defendants upon which their legal liabilities are predicated. In all of
these cases the substance-the tortious conduct-was the same,
to wit: fraud and misrepresentation in the exchange of property.
In all, the plaintiffs were wrongfully deprived of money through
the conduct of the defendants which was tantamount to a detention of the plaintiff's money.
True it is, in the law of damages, that the basis of recovery
in actions ex contractu is n6t the same as in actions ex delicto;
the basis of the former being the value of the benefit to the defendant, while the latter is the detriment to the plaintiff. But
this distinction, although important in other respects in the law
of damages, would seem to be immaterial to the question of interest as damages in fraud cases. Where a defendant has obtained
money or other property from a plaintiff through fraud, there is
both a benefit to the defendant and a detriment to the plaintiff,
the quantum of each, although theoretically different, can be conveniently measured only by using the interest rate as the criterion.
The writer does not disagree with the decision in the Bankers
Trust Co. case, nor does he doubt the validity of the court's reasoning as a matter of abstract law. He submits, however, that reasoning along the line of recission and relation back to the time of
the fraudulent transaction with a breach of a duty to make resti15108 Colo. at p. 33, 113 P. 2d at p. 665.
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tution, was not necessary to the decision. The case could have
been brought under the rule of the conversion and detention cases,
as it was, but without the circuitous reasoning set forth above,
upon the authority, of Mayo v. Wallgren, supra, which, it will be
recalled, permitted a recovery of interest in an action ex delicto
for deceit. Of course, the Clark, Keeney, and Otis cases, supra,
which are contra to the Mayo case, would have had to have been
overruled. But, unless we accept the illusory distinction between
actions ex contractu and actions ex delicto in this respect, these
cases have been impliedly overruled anyway by the Bankers Trust
Co. case.
Be that as it may, the point which all of the .cases emphasize
is that, if interest is recoverable at all, it is so recoverable because
the circumstances of the particular case constrain the court to
look upon the defendant's conduct as amounting to a detention,
or a withholding, if you please, of the plaintiff's property. Thus,
interest is recovered, not as such, but as damages for the withholding of the property.
In summary, the writer has drawn the following conclusions
as a result of this study:
1. Interest will be allowed as a matter of right on damages
for personal injuries occasioned by the tort of another, pursuant to
CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 50, § 5 (1935).
2. Interest will be allowed as a matter of right upon any claim
for money due, from the time the same became due until paid in
the cases enumerated in COLO. STAT. Asp,., c. 88, § 2 (1935). It seems
reasonable to conclude that this statute, although it must be strictly
construed, is, nevertheless, sufficiently broad to cover all cases of
claims for money due where the amount of the claim is liquidated.
Of course, if the rate of interest is specified in a contract, the statute
would not be applicable.
3. Interest in this state is a matter of statute, not of common
law, and is recoverable only in cases enumerated in the statutes, and
damages to property arising from the wrong or negligence of a defendant is not enumerated in the statute. Nor will interest be
allowed on damages for the unauthoriZed taking of land, or, stated
conversely, in eminent domain proceedings, for any period prior to
the judgment or the condemnation award.
4. Where there has been a wrongful detention of property, in
an action either in replevin or trover, interest will be allowed from
the time of the conversion until the time of recovery, not as interest
on damages, but as damages for the detention of the property.
5. In actions involving fraud in the exchange of property, where
the circumstances are such that the court can look upon the defendant's conduct as tantamount to a detention of property, the
same rule will be applied to permit the plaintiff to recover interest
as damages from the time of the fraudulent transaction until the
date of recovery.
6. With the exception of interest on damages for personal injuries, and interest as damages for the detention, or what amounts
to a detention, of property, interest for any period prior to judgment cannot be recovered in Colorado on an unliquidated claim for
damages.
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DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR INJURIES TO
A SPOUSE IN COLORADO
HAMLET J. BARRY, JR.*
of the Denver Bar

Until the passage of the Colorado Married Women's Act in
1868, this state presumably followed the common law doctrine
that a married woman merges into the single legal entity represented by her husband. Apparently under the common law doctrine the wife had no cause of action for recovery for personal
injuries. However, judicial recognition prior to the Married Women's Act did allow the wife to join with her husband in a suit to
recover for her injuries. She could not bring such an action in
her own behalf unless at the time of instituting action her husband
was dead or had deserted her.
The Married Women's Act passed in 1868 in Colorado recognized that a wife Had a right to own property, but limited its
transfer by requiring that her husband join in any conveyance.
Finally, in 1874, by legislative enactment, it was provided that a
wife could sue or be sued in all matters as if she were sole. Provisions to the same effect are to be found in the 2 Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure' and in the Colorado Statutes.
In the case of Rains v. Rains,3 where a wife was allowed to
sue her husband for damages for personal injuries caused by his
negligence, the common law fiction of unity was clearly disavowed.
The language used by the court in the Rains case was rather
strong, and the court held: "Whatever may be the law elsewhere,
if the common law fiction of unity ever existed in this state, it
does not exist here now."
The strong language of this case was obviously not intended
to afford a wife equal position with her husband in regard to the
elements of damages which she may recover for injury to her
husband by the negligent acts of third persons. In this respect,
however, Colorado does not stand alone, since it appears to be
the law of 47 of the 48 states that a wife is not entitled to recover
for her loss of consortium and services resulting from injuries to4
her husband. Only in Georgia does the question remain unsettled.
COMMON LAW RIGHTS REMAIN

Almost uniformly, then, the Married Women's Acts do not
take away from the husband his common law right to recover
against third persons for his loss sustained because of the deprivation of his wife's services, society and companionship. Likewise,
because he is under an obligation to support his wife, the husband,
* Mr. Barry was assisted in the preparation of this article by Thomas W.
student, University of Denver College of Law.
'Rule 17 (1941).
'COLO. STAT. ANN.. C. 108, § 2 (1935).
'97
Colo. 19, 46 P. 2d 740 (1935).
4
1McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E. 2d 299 (1949).
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in addition, is entitled to recover for a iy expenses incurred as a
result of his wife's injury and for any expenses that may ultimately
be incurred in cases of permanent injury. However, there can
be no double recovery for such expenses; if the wife has in fact
paid such expenses and anticipates paying future expense, she
may recover those expenses in her own action.
In the case of Denver Consolidated Tramway Co. v. Riley,5
the court approved an instruction which rather clearly outlines
the husband's elements of damages for injuries to his wife by
third persons. This case followed by many years the enactment
of the Married Women's Act, and tends to emphasize the husband's
common law right. An instruction in the Denver Consolidated
Tramway Co. case allowed the plaintiff husband to recover for
expenses already incurred in endeavoring to effect a cure as well
as for future expenses necessary to the same end, and for the loss
-past, present and prospective-of the society of his wife caused
by her injury.
Under the present status of the law in Colorado, a husband
will be entitled to recover, against a third party whose negligence
has caused injury to his wife, the following elements of damage:
(1) The husband is allowed to recover for expenses incurred and
for expenses which will be incurred in the future in the treatment
of the wife's injury. (2) The husband may also recover for the
past, present and prospective loss of his wife's services. (The
term "services" is interpreted to mean financial loss resulting from
the deprivation to the husband of his wife's services as housekeeper
and mother of the children. 6 ) (3) The husband may be allowed to
recover for his loss of consortium, which is generally interpreted
to mean the loss of society and companionship of his wife.
For injury to the wife, the wife herself may recover: (1)
Damages for physical and mental pain and suffering. (2) Past
and prospective loss of earnings. (Losses resulting from her
(3)
inability to perform duties within the home are excluded.)
Medical expenses in fact paid or incurred by the wife personally.
(4) In the case of Duffy v. Gross, 7 it is indicated that a wife is
entitled, independently of the husband's right, to recover damages
for her inability to labor. From this it might seem to follow that
a wife is entitled to recover for her loss of earnings whether or
not she actually is engaged in employment outside the home. The
case of Duffy v. Gross does not, however, rely upon the principle
of loss of earnings as such, but states that the inability to perform
labor is a form of mental suffering which is difficult to endure,
particularly when the injured person prior to the accident is a
normal, healthy person.
The husband's cause of action is a complete, separate cause
of action which arises concurrently with the injury and is derivative only insofar as the wife's contributory negligence will
14 Colo. App. 132, 59 P. 476 (1899).
'Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry., 78 N. H.
121 Colo. 198, 214 P. 2d 498 (1950).

289, 99 A. 298 (1916).
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defeat his recovery. Accordingly, a finding of contributory negligence in the action of one spouse against the third person is not
res judicata to a later action brought -by the other spouse. 8
There appears to be no cause of action for the wife's recovery
against third persons for injuries to her husband. In the case of
Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Company,9 the husband had
recovered in an earlier action for his injuries, and his wife had
brought this action for the alleged loss of the society and the
consortium of her husband. The defendant's demurrer on the
grounds that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action was sustained by the trial court. Such ruling
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Colorado. In this affirmance the court did point out that there might be one instance in
which a wife could recover for the loss of consortium. This exception would obtain where there has been direct impairment of the
right of consortium, i.e., in an action based upon alienation of
affections. This decision was made in view of the latest provisions
of the Married Women's Act and indicates quite clearly that the
act has not, to date, been interpreted to strengthen the wife's
position to recover for injuries to her husband.
WHERE INJURY CAUSES DEATH

So much for damages for injury to a spouse caused by third
persons-. This discussion logically leads to the question of what
may be recovered when the injury to the spouse results in death.
Covering the husband's rights, we have the case of the American
Insurance Company v. Naylor 10 wherein the husband brought two
actions for the injuries and death of his wife caused by the defendant's negligence. The death action, of course, was brought
under the Wrongful Death Statute. The second action was for
damages to compensate the husband for the loss of his wife's services, companionship and society between the date of her injury and
the date of her death, and also for compensation to him covering
medical expenses, including hospital and nursing costs, necessarily
incurred by him during that period. The cases were tried together,
and the plaintiff recovered judgments on both causes of action.
Upon appeal the defendant contended that recovery by the plaintiff under the Wrongful Death Statute barred his action for loss
of consortium and expenses. Upon this point the court ruled that
the causes of action were separate and did not exclude each other.
Although it is clear that a wife cannot collect damages for
an injury to a husband, she is certainly entitled to recovery under
the Wrongful Death Statute; she is, in fact, one of the class of persons named who has a right of action for the death of her husband
under that statute. Under the statute, a wife was entitled to recover from a third person her pecuniary loss resulting from her
husband's death.
SGilma n v. Gilman, 51 A. 2d 46 (Vt., 1947).
'101 Colo. 258, 75 P. 2d 1100 (1937).
10101 Colo. 41, 70 P. 2d 353 (1937).

294

DICTA

Vol. 28

Until the case of Fish v. Liley," it was generally believed that
a cause of action for wrongful death to a. husband did not survive
the death of a tort-feasor, inasmuch as the survival statute barred
all actions for injuries to the person upon the death of the tortfeasor. In Fish v. Liley, recovery was allowed against the deceased
tort-feasor's estate on the grounds that the right to recover against
the deceased tort-feasor was a property right which survived and
was therefore not an action for trespass for injuries to the person.
It is to be presumed that this doctrine may be extended to include
all persons who were entitled to recover under the Wrongful Death
Statute, including parents, children, and a suit by the husband
against the deceased tort-feasor for the death of his wife.
Perhaps the Fish v. Liley case has further extensions. The
reasoning in the case might open a new avenue for a wife to seek
recovery for injuries which do not result in death. Strictly construed, this case recognizes that a wife has a property right in
the continued life of her husband, the amount of which is measured by her pecuniary loss upon his death. It does 'not take a great
deal of imagination on the basis of this case to see the possibility
that the court might find that the wife has a property right in the
continued physical well-being of her husband and in his continued
availability as a handyman, chauffeur, mechanic and father. Such
loss can be measured with some degree of certainty in much the
same way as the courts measure a husband's right to recover for
the loss of his wife's services as housekeeper, nurse and mother.

CASE COMMENTS
DAMAGES-RECOVERY OF EXPENSES OF LITIGATION IN A SUB-

SEQUENT ACTION-Landis was sued in a tort action by McGowan.
Pikes Peak Company was joined as a defendant, and cross claimed
against Landis as an indemnitor and for costs of defending against
McGowan's action. Costs were awarded the Pikes Peak Company,
as well as to McGowan, who was successful in that litigation. An
appeal was taken by Landis, and Pikes Peak Company only participated to defend the costs awarded by the lower court.' Landis
paid the judgments. Sun Indemnity Co., as subrogee of Pikes
Peak Co. now sues Landis for expense of taking depositions for
use in the prior trial, and attorney fees and disbursements, including $250 for services of attorneys in connection with the appellate
proceedings wherein Pikes Peak Co. obtained affirmance of its
judgment against Landis.
"120 Colo. 156, 208 P. 2d 930 (1949).
'Landis v. McGowan, 114 Colo. 355, 165 P.

2d 180

(1946).
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Held: The indemnitee is not entitled to attorney's fees incurred in connection with trial of the issue of indemnity. Attorney's fees and costs of litigation are recoverable only as part of
the damages resulting from defendant's wrongful act, and plaintiff cannot split his cause of action to recover on part of his costs
in one suit and part of his costs in a subsequent action. Nor can
plaintiff allocate his costs between defending against the claim
filed by McGowan and in asserting his right to indemnity from
Landis. Having asserted a claim for costs in his cross claim,
plaintiff should have made proof of all of his costs in that action,
if he were entitled to them. Having failed to do so, the matter
is now res judicata.-Sun Indemnity Co. v. Landis, 119 Colo. 191,
201 P. 2d 602 (1948).
As a general rule the costs and expenses of litigation, other
than the usual court costs, are not recoverable in an action for
damages nor in a subsequent action for costs incurred in the
previous litigation.2 Early Colorado cases refused attorney fees
as damages, holding that such fees were not to be allowed as damages in the absence of a statute or contract to that effect,3 and
allowance of attorney's fees is not discretionary with the
that the
4
court.

Certain exceptions to this rule have grown up. In suits in
which a fund or estate has been impounded reasonable expenses
including counsel fees incurred by one seeking to collect, or preserve, the fund or estate, will be allowed. 5 It will be noted these
actions are usually equitable in nature. In equity suits where no
fund has been impounded, it has been generally assumed that recovery of expenses should be limited to taxable costs. 6 Where the
adverse claim or defense was unconscionable, fees of counsel have
been allowed as costs, 7 and it is frequently said that assessment
of costs is within the sound discretion of the court. This statement is usually found in cases of an equitable nature.8
It is well settled, and usually provided by statute, that a wife
suing or defending in an action for divorce or separation is entitled to an order requiring the husband to pay her reasonable
counsel fees. Statutes also provide for attorney's fees and other
expenses as items of costs, especially in suits to collect wages,
certain actions against railroad companies and other corporations, etc.
When the natural and probable consequence of a wrongful act
involves a plaintiff in litigation with others, Colorado has genW. 607 (1888) ; Pacific Postal Tel. Cable
2 Winkler v. Roeder, 23 Neb. 706, 37 N.
Co. v. Bank of Palo Alto, 109 F. 369 (1901).
sSpencer v. Murphy, 6 Colo. App. 453, 41 P. 84. (1895).
4 Joslin v. Teats, 5 Colo. App. 531, 39 P.
349 (1895).
6MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES 237 (1935).
Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 286 Il1. 564, 122 N. E. 55 (1919).
'Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 28 F. 2d 233 (1928) ; Geijsbeek v. Martin, 27 Colo App. 316, 148 P. 921 (1915).
v. Willoughby, 71 Colo. 356, 206 P. 792 (1922); Union Exploration
5Willoughby
Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist. 104 Colo. 109, 89 P. 2d 257 (1939).
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erally held reasonable expenses of the litigation may be recovered
from the wrongdoer. 9 This holding is in line with the general
rule. 10 Most courts have held the costs of litigation must be recovered in a subsequent suit, but there seems no reason for this rule,
and one case 11 held attorney fees could be recovered in the same
action between the parties, saying:
The case rests not on the fact that the services of counsel were
rendered in a different action than the one in which recovery was
allowed, but upon the fact that the wrong of defendants was of such
a character that it necessitated the employment of counsel to give
the plaintiff redress.

It would seem from the instant case that Colorado would follow
this view, although it would probably be limited strictly to cases
where the claim of a third party was involved unless the action
were vexatiously
commenced, in which case attorney fees may
12
be allowed.
To give an indemnitee or a joint tort feasor the right to
claim his costs in defending a suit, where he is entitled to indemnity, he must first notify his indemnitor, or joint tort feasor
of the pendency of the suit and call upon him to defend it."3 However, where the indemnitee failed to request the indemnitor to
defend the action against him, and defended with full knowledge
and consent of the indemnitor, it has been held he can recover
14
attorney fees and other expenses incurred in the suit.
The instant case correctly holds, under the orthodox view,
that attorney fees and other costs of litigation cannot be recovered
where the action is to litigate the question of indemnity. But it
would not seem that the problem of allocation of costs between
the defense against liability to a third party, and asserting the
claim for indemnity should have caused the court any difficulty.
That a loss cannot be exactly determined will not defeat a claim
or allow the wrongdoer to escape at the expense of his victim. 1
Whenever the wrongful act of one person results in liability being
imposed on another, the latter may have indemnity from the person actually guilty of the wrong, and this should include his costs
in defending against the suit in which the liability became fixed.1 6
In actions not involving a third person, generally costs are
not allowed to defendant beyond the statutory court costs, on the
theory that to do so would discourage litigation of rightful claims,
and defendant's injury is damnum absque injuria.17 In allowing
'International Bank of Trinidad v. Trinidad Bean and Elevator Co., 79 Colo. 286,
245 P. 489 (1926).
"MCCORMICK ON DAMAGEs 247 (1935).
"Malloy v. Carroll, 287 Mass. 170, 191 N. E. 661 (1934).
2 Colo. Rules Civ. Proc., 3(a).
"Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Northeastern Tel. Exchange Co., 140 Minn.
229, 167 N. W. 800 (1918) ; Ireland v. Linn Co. Bank, 103 Kan. 618, 176 P. 103 (1918).
14Miller v. New York Oil Co., 34 Wyo. 272, 243 P. 118 (1926).
15Goldstein v. Rocky Mountain Envelope Co., 78 Colo. 341, 241 P. 1110 (1925).
"Miller v. New York Oil Co., supra.
"0. S. Stapley Co. v. Rogers, 25 Ariz. 308, 216 P. 1072 (1923).
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expenses as an element of damages, the trend seem to be toward
a more liberal view in equitable actions. In Morris v. Redak,1 8 the
Colorado Supreme Court again supported this view. In denying
plaintiff his costs in securing depositions, the court said:
We consider that taking depositions of witnesses in preparation
for trial is something in the nature of a luxury, and that one who
avails himself of this procedure does so at his own expense. . . . If the
testimony of the person whose deposition is taken is not available
at the trial, and the deposition is offered in lieu thereof, then the
court would have discretion in determining whether the expense of
procuring the deposition should be assessed as costs again the losing
party.
JOHN DALEY
JASON KELLAHIN
DAMAGES-MAY NOMINAL DAMAGES BE RECOVERED WITHOUT

SHOWING ACTUAL DAMAGES?-The parties entered into a written

agreement whereby plaintiff purchased from defendant his interest
in their partnership business, the contract providing that defendant would not reenter business in competition with plaintiff. Defendant, in violation of the agreement, entered business for which
plaintiff brought an action seeking an injunction and damages for
breach of contract. The trial court denied the application for a
temporary injunction because, "There had been no showing of
real or actual injury." The supreme court reversed and remanded
the case with instructions to issue the injunction to be effective
pending determination of the case on its merits.-Ditus v. Beahm,
- Colo. -, 232 P. 2d 184 (1951).
In so holding, the court stated the rule as being well settled
that:
Where an established business has been sold and there is a valid
covenant not to compete, a breach is regarded as the controlling
factor and injunctive relief follows almost as a matter of course.
In such cases the damage is presumed to be irreparable and the
remedy at law is considered inadequate. It is not necessary to first
prove special pecuniary damages or show an actual loss of customers.
Injunctive relief may be given, even though nominal damages are
shown, or although no actual damage is shown.

Although the decision does not specifically deal with the problem of awarding damages, the court limiting its disposition of the
case to the question of the injunction, the language of the court
suggests that the breach of the contract will warrant a judgment
for nominal damages even though actual damages may not be
shown. In granting the injunction, the court particularly stated
that in such case the damage is presumed to be irreparable. Such
damages, it would seem, would require an award for nominal damages even in the absence of actual damage.
Under the prevailing authority, nominal damages are awarded
as a recognition of some breach of duty owed by defendant to
I

1950-51 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. 345 (No.

20, June 30).
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plaintiff and not as compensation for loss or detriment sustained.

In effect the court will allow an adverse relief against the party
owing the duty, if he violates it, though he has caused no loss.'
In breach of contract cases, the rule seems to be settled that
the mere breach by defendant, though unaccompanied by injury2
to plaintiff, gives rise to a cause of action for nominal damages.
On the other hand many courts require a showing of actual damages in cases of fraud and deceit; therefore, without proof of
actual damages the case will fail and nominal damages will not
be allowed. 3 Thus in an aftion to recover damages for false representation, the trial court was reversed for failure to direct a verdict in favor of defendant because of plaintiff's failure to make
out a case of actionable false representation when he had based
his test of an alleged year's value of a business on only one month's
trial. 4 In so deciding, the court held that:
Even if a representatition be fraudulent and of past or existing
fact, and the party to whom it is addressed acts upon it, an action
of deceit will not lie unless damage has resulted.

The general rule seems to be that in the absence of actual
detriment, the plaintiff in an action for trespass to person or
property may nevertheless recover nominal damages, and the rule
is likewise in actions for deliberate and willful trespass. 5 However, it has been recently held by the Colorado Supreme Court that
in an action for assault and battery, the record being devoid of
any evidence of damage sustained by the plaintiff, a directed verdict and judgment for defendant was proper.,
Thus, Ditus v. Beahm does not specifically consider whether a
showing of actual damages must be made to warrant a judgment
for at least nominal damages. It does suggest, however, that since
the mere breach of contract against competing gives rise to a
presumption of irreparable damage so as to warrant a temporary
injunction, such a breach would in addition give rise to actual
damages if so shown. It would at least warrant nominal damages
though the loss of customers or other actual damage has not been
established.
JOSEPH W. OPSTELTEN
BERNARD R. ROTTMAN

'MCCORM'CK
ON DAMAGES 85 (1935).
2 Cooper v. Clute, 174 N.C. 366, 93 S. E. 915 (1917)
Kiblinger v. Sank Bank, 131
Wlsc.2 595, 111 N. W. 709 (1907).
Alden v. Wright, 47 Minn. 225, 49 N.W. 767 (1891)
Bailey v. Oatis, 85 Kan. 339,
116 P. 830 (1911).
4 Sposata v. Heggs ....... Colo ........
1950-51 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. 328 (No. 18, May 26).
6Parker v. Kirkpatrick, 124 Me. 181, 126 A. 824 (1924) ; Lee v. Lee, 180 N.C. 86,
104 S E. 76 (1920).
6Davis v. Heinze, 117 Colo. 155, 184 P. 2d 493 (1947).
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DOUBLE RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
BY PUBLIC CARRIER?
MARY ALICE HIGBEE
of the Fourteenth Judicial District Bar

In the April, 1951, issue of Dicta appears an article by Frances
Hickey Schalow of the University of Denver College of Law, bearing the above title, sans italics.'
What is Mrs. Schalow's hypothetical Mary Doe, or the very
real Mrs. Dodd (plaintiff in No. 2725, Routt County) attempting
to recover? It she asserting two causes of action? The answer is
that she is not. Mrs. Dodd, or Mary, sues for the recovery of
compensatory damages under C.S.A. Ch. 50, Secs. 2 and 3, (1935)
and punitive or exemplary damages under Section 1 of Chapter 50.
No right to double recovery is asserted, nor is it claimed that there
exist two causes of action.
How far are our Colorado courts bound by the Missouri decisions? They are not bound at all, because Colorado has previously
refused to follow earlier Missouri constructions of both the penal
and compensatory sections. Let us first compare Missouri and
Colorado rulings on the penal section, our Section 1. Frederic vs.
D. and R. G. R. R. Co.,2 decided April 6, 1914, says:
"...
indeed, the fact that recovery may be had under it (Sec.
1) without proof whatever of damages conclusively establishes that
it is penal.
... Since we hold the statute penal, it was improper to allow
plaintiffs to prove damages because of the loss of services of and
support by their son ....
The amount of recovery depends solely
on the degree of culpability of the defendant."

Two years previously, March 6, 1912, the Missouri court decided the case of Hegberg vs. St. Louis and S. F. R. Co. 3 and some
years prior thereto, the case of Boyd vs. Ry. 4 While much of what
these cases hold has been overruled by the recent case of Cooper vs.
Kansas City Public Service Co.5 the Hegberg case and others following it, including the Cooper case, approve compensatory damages
under the penal section. The Hegberg case says:
The decision in the Boyd case, supra, declared evidence under
the so-called penal section competent to show the amount of compensatory damages the widow had sustained by reason of the wrongful death of her husband. We see no valid reason why the same rule
would not apply to beneficiaries under the fourth clause of the Section
(See. 1) as well as to those under the preceding clauses.

The case thus holds that compensatory damages are recoverable
under the penal section by any proper plaintiff.
I "Double Recovery for Wrongful Death by Public Carrier?" 28 Dicta 131.
Colo. 90, 140 P. 463.
1147 SW 192 (1912).
236 Mo. 54, 139 SW 561.
5202 SW 2d 42 (1947).
257
4
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The Cooper case 6 holds that a plaintiff may elect to sue under
either section, saying:
* * * we have held (Sec. 1) permits them to take into consideration plaintiff's pecuniary injury. (citing cases) . . . The Grier
case (Grier vs. K. C. and C. C. and St. J. R. Co., 286 Mo. 523, 228
SW 454, 458) says that in fixing the penalty the jury 'should take
into consideration both the facts constituting the negligence or
wrongful act, with the attending mitigating and aggrevating circumstances, and those showing the pecuniary loss inflicted.' The
Treadway case affirmed this and only held that a jury in its discretion might disregard these facts in a penalty case.

It is obvious that Missouri and Colorado regard their nearly
identical penal sections as saying two different things: Colorado
says that the penal section is wholly penal, that no element of
compensation may be allowed to enter into damages recovered under it; Missouri declares that while the statute is penal in form, its
purpose is to compensate the plaintiff and plaintiff's pecuniary loss
is an issue.
We must now consider whether Colorado and Missouri construe the compensatory sections similarly. The question is whether
these sections are purely compensatory, or whether they are both
compensatory and punitive. Determinative of the issue is the construction placed upon Section 3:1
* " * and in every such action the jury may give such damages
as they may deem fair and just ....
with reference to the necessary
injury resulting from such death, to the surviving parties, who may
be entitled to sue; and also having regard to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending such wrongful act, neglect, or default.
(Italics supplied).

Colorado has said, in Moffat vs. Tenny:

s

Since mitigating circumstances relating to the act itself do not
justify an assessment of damages less than compensatory, it is not
reasonable to suppose that the aggravating circumstances contemplated by the statute are such as would justify an assessment of
damages more than compensatory . . . Taken in connection with the
preceding language of the section, we are constrained to hold that the
words 'mitigating and aggravating circumstances attending such
wrongful act' etc., contemplate circumstances not relating to the
wrongful act itself, but such as affect the actual damages suffered
by the surviving party entitled to sue, either by way of diminishing
or enhancing the same. Hence, the section allows compensatory
damages only (Italics supplied.)

Missouri, however, takes a completely different view of this
section. So, in Gray vs. McDonald,9 an earlier case than Moffat
vs. Tenny, 10 the Missouri court said:
Ibid.
S. A., Ch.
817 Colo. 189,
'104 Mo. 303,
10 Supra, note
6

7C.

50, Sec. 3

(1935).

30 P. 348 (1892).
16 S. W. 398 (1891).
8.

See also, 94 ALR 384, 389, notes 12 and 13.
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The real question is whether exemplary damages are to be
allowed in any case where the suit is based upon the before mentioned section . . . Exemplary damages were allowed in many actions
of tort before the passage of the statute in question, and aggravating
and mitigating circumstances were admitted in evidence as affecting
the amount of such damages . . . The expressions aggravating and
mitigating circumstances were well known to the law when used
by the legislature, so that the statute just quoted must mean that
in these actions ... the party suing may recover, not only actual, bt
also exemplary damages. (Italics supplied).

Missouri, then, in cases decided prior to Colorado decisions
on the points, said that in actions under either the penal or the
compensatory sections, the plaintiff may recover both actual and
punitive damages. Colorado ignored those opinions, and has held
that under the penal section, the plaintiff may recover only punitive damages, and the compensatory sections allow only for the
recovery of pecuniary loss.
Mrs. Dodd or Mrs. Schalow's Mary sought to recover only
what Missouri would permit under either section. Because of
Colorado's construction it is necessary to proceed under both in
order to recover actual and exemplary damages. Mrs. Schalow,
Judge A. M. Gooding of the 14th Judicial District, and I conclude
that there is but one cause of action. Judge Gooding and I conclude
that under separate statutory authorizations, the plaintiff in an
action against a common carrier may recover both compensatory
and punitive damages in Colorado.

PERSONALS
Mr. William Stover and Mr. William Allen have formed a
partnership for the general practice of law with offices in the
Poudre Valley National Bank Building at Fort Collins. Mr. Stover
and Mr. Allen were formerly associated with Mr. Herbert Alpert,
prominent member of the Larimer County Bar and of the Colorado Bar Association, who passed away recently.
Mr. Paul E. Wencke, former Larimer County Republican
chairman and former FBI agent, was appointed County Judge
to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Judge Harry H.
Hartman of Larimer County.
Mr. Waldo Riffenburgh and Mr. Ralph Harden announce
the formation of a partnership with offices in the Poudre Valley
National Bank Building in Fort Collins for the general practice
of law.
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
BY ALBERT J. GOULD AND KENNETH L. SMITH
of the Denver Bar

TRACING FIRE INSURANCE PROCEEDS INTO COST OF NEW STRUCTURE

Any gain from involuntary conversion of property such as
that resulting from destruction, theft, seizure or condemnation,
is exempt from taxes by virtue of Section 112 (f) if the proceeds
are used to acquire similar properties or to establish a replacement fund. This exemption was construed very strictly in the
case of Ovider Realty Co., TC. Memo. No. 25795. Taxpayer's
building, destroyed by fire, had an adjusted basis of $54,000.00
and was subject to a mortgage of $53,000.00. The taxpayer delivered the insurance money of $73,000.00 to the mortgagee to
be held in a suspense account pending reconstruction. The estimated cost of reconstruction was in excess of the fire insurance
proceeds and because the financing terms of the original mortgagee for the rebuilding were unsatisfactory, the taxpayer obtained a loan from a mortgagee other than the one with whom
the insurance money was deposited. The taxpayer then authorized
the original mortgagee to satisy its mortgage out of the- insurance
proceeds. The Court held that since the insurance proceeds were
largely used to satisfy the mortgage and since the new building
was constructed principally with the proceeds of a new loan, the
taxpayer's gain was taxable.
Whenever a taxpayer owns property that is involuntarily
converted, full compliance with See. 112 (f) should be made.
SALE OF INDIVIDUAL PROPRIETORSHIP

When an individual proprietorship is sold, the valuation of
certain assets placed by buyer or seller is important. For instance,
a buyer should price inventory and stock in trade high because
it is recoverable in cost of goods sold while the seller should
price the same low as the gain is not an ordinary gain for tax
purposes. Land used in the business should be priced low by
the buyer since it is not depreciable and high by the seller since
land is a See. 117 (j) asset.
Now is the time to renew your membership in the Bar Association for 1951-52. If you have not already done so, see your
local Treasurer promptly.
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FORMS COMMITTEE PRESENTS STANDARDIZED PLEADING SAMPLES TO BE USED
UNDER THE 1951 DETERMINATION
OF INTERESTS STATUTE
All of us have been conscious of the variation in pleadings
used by lawyers in Determination of Interests proceedings. The
1951 session of the legislature passed Senate Bill No. 286 which
provides an entirely revised procedure for Determination of Interests. The effective date of this Act is August 1, 1951.
In an attempt to avoid the multiplicity of pleading types used
by the practitioner, the new statute has received the careful consideration of the Subcommittee on District Court Forms of The
Colorado Bar Association. This committee, composed of Edwin
P. Van Cise, Vance Dittman, Edward C. King and Arthur M.
Schwartz, under the chairmanship of Donald M. Lesher, has
evolved, and submits herewith, proposed sample pleadings which
are designed to comply with the new 1951 statute with a minimum of effort.
The committee solicits suggestions and criticism from members of the bar throughout the state. It may be that the practice
in different counties requires motions or orders other than those
submitted; as suggestions from the bar are received by the committee, the sample pleadings can be amended, corrected, and supplemented.
The committee is planning the proposal of additional pleading
samples to be used in the district court pertaining to divorce
actions, foreclosures through the Public Trustee, negligence actions, quiet title suits, and whatever else appears to be in greatest
demand.
If the committee's work is to bear fruit, suggestions, recommendations, and corrections from the individual members of the
bar will be essential. It is recognized that the program of activity
for the committee may extend over a period of time-perhaps
several years-but it is hoped that, within a reasonable period of
time, this program will have materialized to such an extent that
its efforts will be of help to attorneys.
In addition to the District Court Subcommittee, herewith
reporting, the Forms Standardization Committee is composed of
Subcommittees on County Courts, Real Estate, Justice Courts,
Criminal Instructions, and Civil Instructions, each of which has
under consideration those pleadings and forms within the scope
of its field.
The District Court Subcommittee respectfully reports by sub-
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mitting the following unexpurgated sample pleadings ' to be used
in connection with Determination of Interests proceedings.
Royal C. Rubright, General Chairman,
Forms Standardization Committee,
Colorado Bar Association.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER
AND STATE OF COLORADO
CIVIL ACTION NO. X-711, DIV. 7.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DETERMINATION OF INTERESTS IN THE
LANDS OF
ALPHONSO ABIATHAR GRTHVLM, 2 |
Deceased.a J

PETITION TO
DETERMINE THE
DESCENT OF
PROPERTY

COMES NOW Zebina Hereditament, petitioner, and, as particularly as known or can by due diligence be ascertained, alleges:
That petitioner is the grantee of an heir of decedent; 4 that
Alphonso Abiathar Grthvlm died intestate about the first*day of
October, 1947, at or near Sunlit Beach, County of Sandy, State
of California, his last place of residence having been Sunlit
Beach, County of Sandy, State of California, that administration
of decedent's estate has not been granted in this state within the

I It should be recognized that the committee's recommendations are samples,
not forms. Although it is hoped that an attorney, in bringing a Determination
of Interests proceeding, may find some phraseology herein which may be adaptable to his particular factual situation, the committee.feels that a form, as such,
may be a dangerous thing. It is not the intention of the committee to leave the
impression that only the terminology herein employed is acceptable. Certainly,
there can be nothing wrong with pleadings which comply with the requirements of the statute and use other words. The committee feels, however, that
the proposed samples do comply with statute.
2 Any similarity
between the persons appearing in these samples and
other persons living or dead is not purely co-incidental. The subchairman of
the subcommittee once (1921) knew a lad named Eunander. Translated literally, the name of the patriarch of the Grthvlm family, Alphonso Abiathar,
means "Willing Father of Plenty"; the committee is especially proud of the
fact that the other names used herein likewise have meanings.
I It will be noted that the title has been shortened by Section 34 of the new
act as shown above.
4This phrase should read either:
"An heir of decedent", "the grantee
of an heir of decedent", " a relative of decedent", or "a person claiming an
interest in the hereinafter described property", as the case may be. The new
statute (Section 28) changed the former statute only by changing the phrase
"lands, tenements or hereditaments" to read "real property".
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period of one year from the date of death;' that the names, addresses, 7 and relationships to the decedent of all the heirs 8 entitled
to any interest in the hereinafter described real property are:
Name
Address
Relationship Interest
Beatrice Bridget Grthvlm 00 Nought St.,
Wife
1/2
Sunlit Beach,
California
Celestine Corinna
11 Waan Ave.,
Daughter
1/8
Hpuiwmn
South Saguache,
Colorado
Darius Dexter Grthvlm
22 Tughe St.,
Son
Choo Choo,
Colorado
Ephraim Enos Grthvlm
00 Nought St.,
Son
1/8
Sunlit Beach,
California
Fidelia FaustinaGrthvlm 00 Nought St.,
Daughter
1/8
minor, born March 10, Sunlit Beach,
1933 9

California

That decedent died leaving intestate the following described
real property, located in the State of Colorado, in the City and
County of Denver:
Plot One, Block One, New Monia;10
and that petitioner is the record owner thereof."
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that this Court determine
the heirs of the decedent, the present owners of the real property
above-described, and any2 other pertinent facts, and enter judgment
and decree accordingly.'
6 This phrase should read either as above shown or: "administration of
decedent's estate has been granted in this state within one year from the date
of death but the descent of the real estate has not been therein determined".
The only change in the new statute is to eliminate the phrase, "then after the
final settlement of such estate", from the latter provision. (Section 28).
'The former Section 28 required that the "residences" be stated; the new
statute substituted "addresses".
8 The former Section 28 provided that the grantees of the heirs must also
be stated; the new statute eliminates this requirement.
8 The former Section 28 required
that the petition state "who, if any, are
minors or under legal disabilities, and the names and residences of their
guardians, if any, in this state." The new statute reads: "If an alleged heir
is known to be under legal disability such fact shall be stated".
"The former Section 28 required that the value of the property be
alleged; this requirement has been eliminated. If the action is brought in the
County Court, however, the $2000 jurisdictional requirement should be alleged
as follows: "that the value of such property does not exceed two thousand
dollars". Of great importance is the fact that the former statute required that
a description of all property be given; the new statute requires that a description be given only of the real property the descent of which is sought to be
determined.
"The new statute requires that the name of the record owner be alleged;
the former statute had no such provision.
" This prayer is practically a verbatim copy of the new Section 31, which is
completely rewritten from the former statute.
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Zebina Hereditament
33 Thurt St.
Denver, Colorado
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Silvester Hasede
Attorney(s) for Petitioner
First Majestic Equitable Building
Denver, Colorado
Address
Dylryt 004U
Telephone

THE STATE OF COLORADO
OF DENVERJ
CITY AND COUNTY

"

The undersigned, being duly sworn, says: that the facts set
forth in this petition are true.
Silvester Hasede
3
Attorney for Petitioner.1
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of July, 1951.
My commission expires November 22, 1951.
(SEAL)
Uriah Urban
Notary Public.
(USE CAPTION)
IN THE MATTER OF THE DETERMINATION OF INTERESTS IN THE LANDS OF

ORDER FOR ISSUANCE
OF NOTICE, FOR
PUBLICATION THEREOF,
ALPHONSO ABIATHAR
|
AND FOR SERVICE
BY MAIL 14
GRTHVLM, Deceased.J
The Clerk is ordered to issue the attached notice and to mail
a copy of said notice 15 to all persons named in16 the petition as
heirs whose addresses are shown in the petition.
The petition shall be verified by the petitioner or by his attorney. This
proceeding may be brought in the District Court in the county in which the
decedent was last a resident, or the county in which the property or some
portion thereof is situated, or in the County Court of any such county if the
value of the property does not exceed $2000. (Section 28).
'4It is believed that a motion for issuance of notice, publication, and service
by mail could be dispensed with, so long as the order itself appears in the file;
if, however, a motion is also required, that requirement could be satisfied by
attaching to the order the following: "Petitioner moves that the attached order
be issued".
" The former statute required that a copy of the notice and a copy of the
petition be mailed. The new Section 29 eliminates the necessity of mailing
a copy of the petition.
6 The former statute required mailing to all persons named in the petition
as heirs, who reside out of the state and whose addresses are shown or brought
to the court's attention. Mailing must now be made to each heir whose address
is shown in the petition, whether he resides in the state, or out. This should
be particularly noted.
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It is also ordered that said notice be published once each week
for four successive weeks in the Denver Clarion a newspaper published in this county."
Done in Open Court this 17th day of July, 1951.
BY THE COURT,
Zadok Zedekiah
Judge.

(USE CAPTION)
IN THE MATTER OF THE DETERMINATION OF INTERESTS IN THE LANDS OF

NOTICE

18

ALPHONSO ABIATHAR GRTHVLM,
Deceased.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO
TO BEATRICE BRIGET GRTHVLM, CELESTINE CORINNA HPUIWMN, DARIUS DEXTER GRTHVLM, EPHRAIM
ENOS GRTHVLM, and FIDELIA FAUSTINA GRTHVLM, heirs
at law of Alphonso Abiathar Grthvlm, Deceased, to all persons who
are or claim to be heirs of said decedent, and to all persons interested, GREETING:
TAKE NOTICE that a Petition has been filed in this cause
alleging that the above named decedent died leaving the following
described real property situate in the City and County of Denver,
State of Colorado, to-wit:
Plot One, Block One, New Monia
That the Petition names the above named persons as the heirs
at law of decedent.
You are notified to answer said petition within twenty days
after personal service of this notice on you, or within twenty days
after the last publication of this notice, if served by publication;
and in default of an answer the Court will proceed to hear the
matter after expiration of the last period for answer.
Dated at Denver, Colorado, this 17th day of July, A. D. 1951.
(SEAL)
Hezekiah Hosea
Clerk of Said Court.

" Insert:
"A newspaper of general circulation in an adjoining Colorado
county", if there is no newspaper of general circulation published in the county
where the proceeding is filed.
18The form of notice is now statutory. (Section 29).
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(USE CAPTION)
IN THE MATTER OF THE DETERMINATION OF INTERESTS IN THE
LANDS OF

CERTIFICATE
OF MAILING
OF NOTICE 19

ALPHONSO ABIATHAR GRTHVLM,
Deceased.
I hereby certify that I have this day mailed a copy of the
Notice in the above entitled action to each of the following persons
at the addresses set opposite their respective names, each envelope
being addressed with sufficient postage prepaid to carry it to its
destination:
Address
Name
00 Nought St., Sunlit Beach, CaliBeatrice Bridget Grthvlm
fornia
11 Waan Ave., South Saguache,
Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn
Colorado
22 Tughe St., Choo Choo, Colorado
Darius Dexter Grthvlm
00 Nought St., Sunlit Beach, CaliEphraim Enos Grthvlm
fornia
00 Nought St., Sunlit Beach, CaliFidelia Faustina Grthvlm
fornia
Dated this 18th day of July, 1951.20
Hezekiah Hosea
(SEAL)
Clerk of Said Court.
(USE CAPTION)
IN THE MATTER OF THE DETERMINATION OF INTERESTS IN THE LANDS OF
CONSENT

21

ALPHONSO ABIATHAR GRTHVLM,
Deceased.
19The former Section 29 provided that no service by mailing or personal
service shall be required to be given to any person, of full age, who shall
properly execute a consent. The new statute provides only that no notice
by personal service need be given if a consent is executed. Because Section 29
provides: "The Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of the Notice to each heir
", it would appear that mailing is
whose address is shown in the Petition ....
necessary whether or not a consent has been executed and whether or not the
heir has been personally served. As a practical matter, if a consent is executed
and filed in the cause, the heir, even without mailing, is probably within the
jurisdiction of the court, and if a conveyance is executed by the heir, he could
not complain about any lack of mailing to him.
29 required that the mailing occur within ten days
20 The former Section
after the issuance of the notice; the new statute requires that mailing occur "at
least 30 days prior to entry of decree". If mailing does not occur, therefore,
within the 10 days formerly required, the only effect will be to delay the entry
of the decree until 30 days have passed after the mailing.
11Section 29 now provides: "No personal service shall be required on any
person of full age who shall by writing, duly acknowledged before an officer
authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds, consent to the hearing of the
Petition or that the prayer of the Petition be granted". The former statute
also provided that the consent may be signed in open court; this provision has
been eliminated.
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The undersigned, of full age, heirs at law of Alphonso Abiathar
Grthvlm, deceased, do hereby consent to the hearing of the petition filed in the above entitled cause and that the prayer thereof
be granted.
Beatrice Bridget Grthvlm
Ephraim Enos Grthvlm
(Heirs of Decedent)
STATE OF CALIFORNIAs
COUNTY OF SANDY

J

SS.

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
19th day of july, 1951, by Beatrice Bridget Grthvlm and Ephraim
Enos Grthvlm.
Witness my hand and official seal.
My commission expires June 2, 1953.
(NOTARIAL SEAL)

Griselda Godwin
Notary Public

(May be included on reverse side of Notice.)
RETURN OF SHERIFF
STATE OF COLORADO

J
COUNTY OF SAGUACHE
I hereby certify that I have duly served the within notice 22
this 20th day of July, 1951, by personally delivering to and leaving with each of the following named persons a true copy thereof
on the dates and at the places set opposite their respective names:
Name
Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn
(SEAL)

" The

Date
July 20, 1951

Place
South Saguache,
Colorado

Heman Herbert Herman
Sheriff
only material change in the requirement for personal service is that

only a copy of the notice need be served. The former law required service of
a copy of the notice and a copy of the petition. Personal service must still be
had on "all persons residing in this state who are named in said Petition as
heirs of the decedent and whose addresses are shown in the Petition". This is
not a material change from the former statute.
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY DISINTERESTED PARTY
STATE OF COLORADO

SS.

COUNTY OF SAGUACHEJ
The undersigned affiant, being sworn, says: that affiant is
over the age of eighteen years and is not a party to this action or
proceeding ;.that affiant duly served the within notice by personally
delivering to and leaving with each of the following named persons a true copy thereof on the dates and at the places set opposite
their respective names:
Name
Date
Place
Darius Dexter Grthvlm
July 21, 1951
Choo Choo, Colorado
Israel Ignatius
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of July, 1951.
My commission expires May 3, 1954.
(NOTARIAL SEAL)
Juliana Justina
Notary Public
(USE CAPTION)
IN THE MATTER OF THE DETERMI-

NATION OF INTERESTS IN THE

LANDS OF

1

ORDER FOR

APPOINTMENT OF
A GUARDIAN

AD LITEM 23
ALPHONSO ABIATHAR GRTHVLM,
Deceased. J
Launcelot Leonidas is hereby appointed guardian ad litem, and
he is directed to appear 24 for FideliaFaustina Grthvlm, a minor 25
for whom no general guardian26 has appeared.
Done in open court this 5th day of September, 1951.
BY THE COURT,
Zadok Zedekiah
Judge
(USE CAPTION)

IN THE MATTER OF THE DETERMINATION
OF INTERESTS IN THE LANDS OF
DECREE
ALPHONSO ABIATHAR GRTHVLM,
Deceased.

"3

Presented for use only in those counties requiring such formal order. Re
motion: see Note 14.
"The new Section 30 changes slightly the wording of the-former statute
which ambiguously used the phrase, "before any testimony is taken . .
'Substitute
"under legal disability" where applicable.
' Substitute "conservator" where applicable.
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THIS MATTER having come on to be heard this 14th day of
September, 1951.
THE COURT DOTH FIND:
That the matters as stated in the petition are true; that notice
has been properly served in accordance with statute ;27 that no persons in interest have appeared ;21that more than twenty days have
elapsed since the date of the last publication of notice or the last
personal service; and that more than thirty days have elapsed
since the date of the mailing of notice.
That Alphonso Abiathar Grthvlm died intestate on October
1, 1947, at Sunlit Beach, California; that no administration of his
29
estate has been granted in this State.
That he died seized and possessed of the following real property:
Plot One, Block One, New Monia, City and County of
Denver, State of Colorado.
That his sole and only heirs at law and the interests each was
entitled to in the above described property are:
Name
Interest
Beatrice Bridget Grthvlm ..-..----..
...........--1/2
Celestine Corinna Hpuiwmn..............................1/8
Darius Dexter Grthvlm...................
1/8
Ephraim Enos Grthvlm .................................. 1/8
Fidelia Faustina Grthvlm............................. 1/8
That petitioner herein is the present owner of said real property by conveyance from said heirs.
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above-named heirs are the sole and only heirs at
law of said decedent, and that Zebina Hereditament, the petitioner
herein, is now the present owner 30 of the above described real
31
property.
Done in open Court this 14th day of September, 1951.
BY THE COURT:
Zadok Zedekiah
' In the event that an answer has been filed byJudge
a person in interest, such
person shall be notified of the time that a request for hearing on the petition
will be made. This notice shall be given pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure. (Section 30).
"' The former Section 32 gave any heir or his grantee, not personally served
with notice, and not appearing at the hearing, two years in which to move to
reopen the decree. The new statute provides that any heir or interested person
not personally served with notice and not appearing at the hearing, "may file an
answer at any time within six months after the entry of judgment and decree,
but not thereafter, and shall be entitled to a hearing on such answer".
'9 If
such be the case. See Note 6.
The new Section 31 provides that the court shall determine the present
owners of the real property, whereas the former statute provided that the
decree shall name the persons entitled to interest therein.
"§ 33 provides: "Proceedings under this act may be joined with any action
affecting real property brought under the Rules of Civil Procedure. In the event
of such joinder the proceedings shall be conducted in compliance with said
Rules". The former statute permitted joinder with an action for partition.
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ARE YOU PROUD OF YOUR PROFESSION?
If you have pride in being a member of our profession, then
we invite you to apply for membership in the American Bar Association, unless you are already a member. It needs active manpower. It needs you.
The question is not what the American Bar Association can
do for you. It can and will do more things for you than can be
enumerated here. For example, its members make twice as much
money as non-members.
But, our profession exists not primarily for any selfish gain
of its members. Its justification is that it is dedicated to public
service. Ask your heart if you have done your part.
In the name of our profession, of its public duty and of our
beloved free country, we call upon all lawyers to become active
members of their community, state and national bar associations, to
give of their time and talent to bring themselves and their organized bar to the public influence and leadership of this country
in its time of crisis. Those who have neglected any part of this
high duty must never neglect it again, if they would be fully respected and honored by their brothers.
We urge all lawyers to fulfill their obligations by becoming
or by getting members in the bar associations, by faithfully reading their journals, by finding their fields of greatest interest where
they are most needed and by rolling up their sleeves and doing
their share of the work that waits for them.
Won't you join with us in the greatest work you could do?
The Headquarters of the American Bar Association, 1140 North
Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, will be glad to supply you
with as many membership blanks as you may desire.
CODY FOWLER, President, American Bar Association.

WILL YOU BE CORRECTLY LISTED IN THE NEXT
MARTI NDALE-HUBBELL?
Information regarding changes in listing in the MartindaleHubbell Law Directory (1952 edition) for subscribers as well as
non-subscribers including the address of a former member or
associate, if known, should reach the publisher at Summit, New
Jersey, not later than September 1st. If so requested, this information will be held in confidence until the publication date which
will be about January 1, 1952.
Lawyers not currently listed should be certain that the following information, i.e., name, address, year of birth, state and year
of admission and educational data reaches the Company by the
date indicated above either on the Company's Personal Report
Form or by special letter. This is very important as the Special
Lawyers Census Committee of the American Bar Association is
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working through the Martindale-Hubbell organization in the making of a census of all American lawyers, including those in government or military service, corporate employment, teaching positions, retirement, etc.

DENVER COURTS ELIMINATE UNNECESSARY PAGES
FROM CERTIFICATIONS
On July 19th the County and District Courts of Denver inaugurated a policy of supplying certified documents without
including placitas, preambles or separate certification sheets. This
action was taken in order to save attorneys and their clients
unnecessary recording expenses due to the increase in recording
fees to $1.25 per page.
Judge David Brofman of the County Court of Denver addressed a request for an opinion to the Real Estate Standards
Committee of the Denver Bar Association as to the legality and
acceptability of eliminating these items from certifications. The
committee, in approving their elimination, said in part:
"The committee is of the opinion that the placita and
the preamble heretofore attached to such certifications
are not required by any known statute and are further
of the opinion that if these additional pages were omitted
from the certification the certified copy would be acceptable, upon recording, for real estate title purposes. The
committee is further of the opinion that if a rubber stamp
were properly executed and ensealed such stamp would
be sufficient certification."
The committee did not feel competent to pass upon the need
for such extra "trimmings" on certifications to be used out of
state. As a matter of policy the Clerks of the.County and District
Courts will now supply certified documents without placitas, preambles or separate certification sheets unless the requesting attorney specifically directs otherwise, or unless an exemplified copy
is requested.
The Form Standardization Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association will attempt to secure state-wide approval of this
new certification policy.

THE BOOK TRADER'S CORNER
Attorney George W. Lane of Durango offers for sale a complete set of the session laws of Colorado, fully annotated by interlineation and rebound and complete with all official compilations.
He also offers a complete set of the published senate and house
journals. All volumes are in excellent condition.
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